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Heterogeneous firm papers which need para-
metric distributions—most of the literature 
following Melitz (2003)—use the Pareto distri-
bution. The use of this distribution allows a large 
set of heterogeneous firms models to deliver 
the simple gains from trade (GFT) formula 
developed by Arkolakis, Costinot, and 
Rodríguez-Clare (2012) (hereafter ACR). 
This implication is closely tied to the fact that 
Pareto allows for a constant elasticity of substi-
tution import system.1
Three important criteria have motivated 
researchers to select the Pareto distribution for 
heterogeneity. The first is tractability. Assuming 
Pareto makes it relatively easy to derive aggre-
gate properties in an analytical model. Users of 
the Pareto distribution also justify it on empiri-
cal and theoretical grounds. For example, ACR 
argue that the Pareto provides “a reasonable 
approximation for the right tail of the observed 
distribution of firm sizes” and is “consistent 
with simple stochastic processes for firm-level 
growth, entry, and exit...”
1 Two papers remove the long fat tail of the standard 
Pareto by bounding productivity from above. The first, 
Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008), shows that this 
leads to variable trade elasticities. The more recent, Feenstra 
(2013), shows how double-truncated Pareto changes the 
analysis of procompetitive effects of trade. 
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This paper investigates the consequences of 
replacing the assumption of Pareto heterogene-
ity with log-normal heterogeneity. This case 
is interesting because it (i) maintains some 
desirable analytic features of Pareto; (ii) fits 
the complete distribution of firm sales rather 
than just approximating the right tail; and (iii) 
can be generated under equally plausible pro-
cesses (see online Appendix). The log-normal 
is reasonably tractable but its use sacrifices 
some “scale-free” properties conveyed by the 
Pareto distribution. Aspects of the calibration 
that do not matter under Pareto lead to impor-
tant differences in the gains from trade under 
log-normal.
I. Welfare Theory
We assume constant elasticity of substitution (CES) monopolistic competition with a repre-
sentative worker of country i endowed with  L i 
efficiency units, paid wages  w i , and facing price 
index  P i . As shown in the online Appendix, wel-
fare (defined by real income) is given by
(1)  핎 i ≡   w i  L i  _ P i   =  ( L _ σ  f  ii 1/σ )  σ _ σ−1   σ − 1 _ τ ii  α ii *  ,
where  α ii *,  τ ii , and  f ii denote the internal 
 zero-profit cost, trade cost, and fixed production 
cost.
Following a change in international trade 
costs, welfare varies according to changes in the 
only endogenous variable in (1),  α ii *:
(2)  d  핎 i  _
 핎 i   = −  
d  α ii * _ α ii *  =  
1 _  ϵ ii   ( d π ii  _ π ii   −  d M i e  _ M i e   ) .
Changes in welfare depend on changes in the 
domestic trade share,  π ii , and in the mass of 
domestic entrants,  M i e . Both effects are stronger 
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when the partial trade elasticity,  ϵ ii , that affects 
internal trade is small.2
The result in (2) that marginal changes in wel-
fare mirror changes in the domestic cost cutoff 
focuses our attention on the role of selection. 
Assuming that successful entry in the domestic 
market is prevalent, it is the left tail of the distri-
bution that is crucial for welfare. This is the part 
of the distribution where Pareto and log-normal 
differ most strikingly.
Shifting to the last equality in (2), welfare falls 
with the domestic market share since  ϵ ii < 0 but 
it is increasing in the mass of entrants. Under 
Pareto,  ϵ ni = ϵ, a constant across country pairs, 
which implies d M i e = 0.3 This means we can 
integrate marginal changes to obtain the simple 
welfare formula of ACR, where   핎 i =   π ii 1/ϵ , 
where “hats” denote proportional changes. The 
 log-normal case is much more complex and 
requires knowledge of the whole distribution of 
bilateral cutoffs. To build intuition on when and 
why departing from Pareto matters, we investi-
gate the simplest possible case, the two-country 
symmetric version of the model described by 
Melitz and Redding (2013).
II. Calibration of the Symmetric Model
To consider the case of two symmetric 
countries of size L, set  τ ni =  τ in = τ,  τ ii = 1, 
 f ii =  f d ,  f ni =  f in =  f x . We know from (1) that 
the domestic cutoff,  α ii * =  α d * is the sole endog-
enous determinant of welfare. In this model, the 
cutoff equation is derived from the zero profit 
condition, one for the domestic and one for the 
export market in the trading equilibrium. Under 
symmetry, the ratio of export to domestic cutoffs 
depends only on a combination of parameters:
(3)   α x * _ α d *  =  
1 _ τ  (  f d  _  f x ) 1/(σ−1) .
Equilibrium also features the free-entry con-
dition that expected profits are equal to sunk 
costs:
2 By “partial” we mean that incomes and price indices are 
held constant as in a gravity equation estimated with origin 
and destination fixed effects. 
3 See the working paper version of ACR for the proof. 
(4)  f d × G( α d *)[( α d *) − 1]
 +  f x × G( α x *)[( α x *) − 1] =  f E .
The  function is defined as ( α * ) 
≡  1 _ 
 α *1−σ   ∫ 0  α 
*   α 1−σ  g(α) _ 
G( α * ) dα, a monotonic, invert-
ible function. Equations (3) and (4) charac-
terize the equilibrium domestic cutoff  α d *. 
Once the values for L, τ, f,  f   E ,  f x , σ have been 
set, and the functional form for G(  ) has been 
chosen, one can calculate welfare. Following (1), the GFT simplifies to the ratio of domes-
tic cutoffs, autarkic over openness cases: 핋 i =  α dA * / α d * . The domestic cutoff in autarky is 
obtained by restating the free entry condition as 
 f d × G( α dA * )[( α dA * ) − 1] =  f E .
The last step is therefore to specify G(α). 
Pareto-distributed productivity φ ≡ 1/α implies 
a power law cumulative distribution function (CDF) for α, with shape parameter θ. A log-nor-
mal distribution of α retains the log-normality 
of productivity (with location parameter μ and 
dispersion parameter ν) but with a change in the 
log-mean parameter from μ to −μ. The CDFs 
for α are therefore given by
(5) G(α) = {  ( α _  _ α ) θ    Φ  ( ln α + μ _ν  )    Pareto     Log-normal, 
where we use Φ to denote the CDF of the stan-
dard normal. The equations needed for the quan-
tification of the gains from trade are therefore (3) and (4), which provide  α d * conditional on 
G( α d *), itself defined by (5).
A. The Four Key Moments
There are four moments that are crucial in 
order to calibrate the unknown parameters of the 
two-country model.
M1: The share of firms that pay the sunk 
cost and successfully enter: G( α d *) in the model. 
Since the number of firms that pay the entry cost 
but exit immediately is not observable, M1 is 
a challenge to calibrate. We show in the online 
Appendix that under Pareto, the GFT calcula-
tion is invariant to M1. Unfortunately, M1 mat-
ters under log-normal, so our sensitivity analysis 
considers a range of values.
M2: The share of firms that are success-
ful exporters: G( α x *)/G( α d *) in the model. 
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The target value for M2 is 0.18, based on 
export rates of US firms reported by Melitz and 
Redding (2013).
M3 is the data moment used to calibrate the 
firm’s heterogeneity parameter: θ in Pareto and ν 
in log-normal. There are two alternative moments 
that the model links closely to the heterogeneity 
parameters. The first, which we refer to as M3, 
is an estimate derived from the distribution of 
firm-level sales (exports) in some market: the 
microdata approach, on which we concentrate in 
the main text. The second, which we call M3′ is 
the trade elasticity  ϵ x : the  macrodata approach, 
covered in the online Appendix.
M4: The share of export value in the total 
sales of exporters. Using CES and symmetry, 
M4 sets the benchmark trade cost  τ 0 . Indeed, 
M4 =   τ 0 1−σ  _ 
1 +  τ 0 1−σ  , which Melitz and Redding (2013) take as 0.14 from US exporter data. Setting σ = 4, we have  τ 0 = ([(1 − M4)/M4] ) 1/3 = 1.83.
Two parameters still need to be set: the CES σ, and the domestic fixed cost,  f d . We follow 
Melitz and Redding (2013) in setting σ = 4. 
Since equations (3) and (4) imply that only rela-
tive  f x / f d matters for equilibrium cutoffs, we set 
f d = 1.
B. QQ Estimators of Shape Parameters
Each of the two primitive distributions is 
characterized by a location parameter ( _ α ≡ 1/ φ _
in Pareto or μ in log-normal) and a shape param-
eter (θ or ν) governing heterogeneity. For the 
trade elasticities and GFT, location parameters 
do not matter whereas heterogeneity (falling 
with θ and rising with ν) is crucial.
As comprehensive and reliable data on 
firm-level productivity are difficult to obtain, we 
instead obtain M3 from data on the size distri-
bution of exports for firms from a given origin 
in a given destination. In so doing, we rely on 
the CES monopolistic competition assump-
tion, which implies that sales of an exporter 
from i to n, with cost α can be expressed as 
 x ni (α) =  K ni  α 1−σ . The  K ni factor combines all 
the terms that depend on origin and destination 
but not on the identity of the firm.
Pareto and log-normal variables share the 
feature that raising them to a power retains the 
original distribution, except for simple transfor-
mations of the parameters. Therefore, CES-MC 
combined with productivity  distributed 
Pareto ( φ _, θ) implies that the sales of firms 
in any given market will be distributed Pareto 
( ˜ φ _,   ˜ θ ), where  ˜ θ =  θ _ σ − 1 . If φ is log  (μ, ν) 
then  φ σ−1 is log  ( ˜ μ ,  ˜ ν ), with  ˜ ν = (σ − 1)ν. 
Estimating  ˜ θ and  ˜ ν , and postulating a value for σ, we can back out estimates of θ and ν.
We estimate 1/ ˜ θ and  ˜ ν by taking advan-
tage of a linear relationship between empirical 
quantiles and theoretical quantiles of log sales 
data. Originally used for data visualization, the 
asymptotic properties of this method are ana-
lyzed by Kratz and Resnick (1996), who call it 
a QQ estimator. Dropping country subscripts for 
clarity, we denote sales as  x i where i now indexes 
firms ascending order of individual sales. 
Thus, i = 1 is the minimum sales and i = n is 
the maximum. The empirical quantiles of the 
sorted log sales data are  핈 i E = ln  x i and the 
empirical CDF is   F i = (i − 0.3)/(n + 0.4).
The distribution of ln  x i takes an exponential 
form if  x i is Pareto:
(6)  F P (ln x) = 1 − exp[− ˜ θ (ln x − ln  x _)], 
whereas the corresponding CDF of ln  x i under 
log-normal  x i is normal:
(7)  F LN (ln x) = Φ((ln x −  ˜ μ )/ ˜ ν ).
The QQ estimator minimizes the sum of the 
squared errors between the theoretical and 
empirical quantiles. The theoretical quantiles 
implied by each distribution are obtained by 
applying the respective formulas for the inverse 
CDFs to the empirical CDF:
(8)  핈 i P =  F P −1 (  F i ) = ln  x _ −  1 _ 
 ˜ θ ln(1 −  
 F i ),
(9)  핈 i LN =  F LN −1(  F i ) =  ˜ μ / ˜ v +  ˜ v  Φ −1 (  F i ).
The QQ estimator regresses the empirical quan-
tile,  핈 i E , on the theoretical quantiles,  핈 i P or 
 핈 i LN . Thus, the heterogeneity parameter  ˜ ν of the 
log-normal distribution can be recovered as the 
coefficient on  Φ −1 (  F i ). The primitive productiv-
ity parameter ν is given by  ˜  ν/(σ − 1). In the 
case of Pareto, the right-hand side variable is −ln(1 −   F i ). The coefficient on −ln(1 −   F i ). 
gives us 1/ ˜ θ from which we can back out the 
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primitive parameter θ = (σ − 1) ˜ θ . We provide 
more information on the QQ estimator and com-
pare it to the more familiar rank-size regression 
in the online Appendix.
One advantage of the QQ estimator is that the 
linearity of the relationship between the theo-
retical and empirical quantiles means that the 
same estimate of the slope should be obtained 
even when the data are truncated. If the assumed 
distribution (Pareto or log-normal) fits the data 
well, we should recover the same slope estimate 
even when estimating on truncated subsamples.
We implement the QQ estimators on 
firm-level exports for the year 2000, using two 
sources, one for French exporters, and the other 
one for Chinese exporters. For both sets of 
exporters we use a leading destination: Belgium 
for French firms and Japan for Chinese ones. 
The precise mapping between productivity and 
sales distributions only holds for individual des-
tination markets. Nevertheless, we also show in 
the online Appendix that the total sales distribu-
tion for French and Spanish firms follow distri-
butions that resemble the log-normal more than 
the Pareto. As the theory fits better for producing 
firms, we show in results available upon request 
that the sample excluding intermediary firms 
continues to exhibit log-normality.
Table 1 reports results of QQ regressions for 
log-normal (middle rows) and Pareto (bottom 
rows) assumptions for the theoretical quantiles. 
The first column retains all French exporters to 
Belgium in 2000, whereas the other columns 
successively increase the amount of truncation. 
The log-normal quantiles can explain 99.9 per-
cent of the variation in the untruncated empiri-
cal quantiles, compared to 80 percent for Pareto. 
In the log-normal case the slope coefficient 
remains stable even as increasingly high shares 
of small exporters are removed. This is what 
one would expect if the assumed distribution is 
correct. On the other hand, truncation dramati-
cally changes the slope for the Pareto quantiles. 
This echoes results obtained by Eeckhout (2004) 
for city size distributions.
When running the same regressions on 
Chinese exports to Japan (the corresponding 
table can be found in the online Appendix), the 
same pattern emerges: log-normal seems to be 
a much better description of the data. The easi-
est way to see this is graphically. Figure 1 plots 
for both the French and the Chinese samples the 
relationship between the theoretical and empiri-
cal quantiles (top) and the histograms (bottom).
III. Microdata Simulations
Here we take as a benchmark M3 the values 
of θ obtained from truncated sample columns 
of Table 1. While this does not matter much for 
log-normal (for which we take the untruncated 
estimates), it is compulsory for Pareto, since the 
model needs θ > σ − 1 > 3 for that case. With 
the value of θ = 4.25 used by Melitz and Redding (2013) in mind, we choose the top 1 percent esti-
mates as our benchmark: that is θ = 3.849 and ν = 0.797 for the French exporters case, and θ = 4.854 and ν = 0.853 for China.
We present results in a set of figures that show 
the GFT for both the Pareto and the log-normal 
cases, for values of  τ 0 /2 < τ < 2 τ 0 , with  τ 0 , our 
benchmark level of trade costs. An advantage of 
that focus is that it keeps us within the range of 
parameters where  α x * <  α d *, ensuring that export-
ers are partitioned (in terms of productivity) from 
firms that serve the domestic market only.
Table 1—Pareto versus log-Normal: QQ Regressions (French exports to Belgium in 2000)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sample All Top 50% Top 25% Top 5% Top 4% Top 3% Top 2% Top 1%
Observations 34,751 17,376 8,688 1,737 1,390 1,042 695 347
log-normal:  ˜ ν 2.392 2.344 2.409 2.468 2.450 2.447 2.457 2.486
  R 2 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.999 0.998 0.998 0.996 0.992
 ν 0.797 0.781 0.803 0.823 0.817 0.816 0.819 0.829
Pareto: 1/ ˜ θ 2.146 1.390 1.174 0.915 0.884 0.855 0.822 0.779
  R 2 0.804 0.966 0.981 0.990 0.992 0.994 0.994 0.994
 θ 1.398 2.158 2.555 3.278 3.392 3.511 3.650 3.849
Notes: The dependent variable is the log exports of French firms to Belgium in 2000. The RHS is  Φ −1 (  F i ) for log-normal and 
ln (1 −   F i )for Pareto. ν and θ are calculated using σ = 4 .
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As stated above, the share of firms that enter 
successfully (M1) affects gains from trade in 
the log-normal case, but not in the Pareto one. 
Figure 2 investigates the sensitivity of results 
when entry rates goes from tiny values (0.0055 
as in Melitz and Redding (2013), to very large 
ones (up to 0.75). The online Appendix shows 
that the impact of a rise in M1 on GFT is in gen-
eral ambiguous, depending on relative rates of 
changes under autarky and trading situations. 
A unique feature of Pareto is that those rates of 
change are exactly the same. Under log-normal, α dA * rises faster than  α d *. Intuitively, this is due to 
an additional detrimental effect on purely local 
firms under trade. In that situation, exporters at 
home exert a pressure on inputs, and exporters 
from the foreign country increase competition 
on the domestic market, such that the change 
in expected profits (determining the domestic 
cutoff) is lower under trade than under autarky, 
and gains from trade increase with M1. This 
reinforces the point following from equation (1) that it is not only the behavior in the right 
tail of the productivity distribution that matters 
for welfare. When M1 increases, cutoffs lie in 
regions where the two distributions diverge, 
and that affects relative welfare in a quantita-
tively relevant way. This raises the question of 
the  appropriate value of M1. The fact that we 
do observe in the French, Chinese, and Spanish 
domestic sales data a bell-shaped probability 
distribution function (PDF) suggests that more 
than half the potential entrants are choosing 
to operate (otherwise we would face a strictly 
declining PDF). As a conservative estimate, we 
therefore set M1 = 0.5 as our benchmark.
The second simulation, depicted in Figure 3, 
looks at the influence of truncation for combina-
tions of parameters of the distributions. We keep ν at its benchmark level. Now it is the Pareto 
case that varies according to the different val-
ues of θ chosen (which depends on truncation). 
It is interesting to note that in both cases a larger 
variance in the productivity of firms (low θ or 
high ν) increases welfare: heterogeneity mat-
ters. Hence truncating the data, which results 
in larger values of θ—needed for the integrals 
to be bounded in this model—has an important 
effect on the size of gains from trade obtained: 
it  lowers them.
IV. Discussion
In alternative simulations (in the online 
Appendix), we calibrate heterogeneity param-
eters on the macrodata trade elasticity, and find 
slight differences in GFT between the Pareto 
and log-normal assumptions. Hence, the pre-
cise method of calibration matters a great 
deal when trying to assess the importance of 
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Figure 1. QQ Graphs
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the  distributional assumption. The microdata 
method points to large GFT differences when 
the macrodata method points to very similar 
welfare outcomes.
Which calibration should be preferred? ACR 
make a compelling case for the macrodata cali-
bration. However, we have several concerns. 
First, it seems more natural to actually use 
firm-level data to recover firms’ heterogeneity 
parameters. More crucially, a gravity equation 
with a constant trade elasticity is misspecified 
under any distribution other than Pareto. That 
is, the empirical prediction that  ϵ ni is constant 
across pairs of countries is unique to the Pareto 
distribution. The two papers we know of that test 
for non-constant trade elasticities (Helpman, 
Melitz, and Rubinstein 2008 and Novy 2013) find 
distance elasticities to be indeed  nonconstant. 
Panel A. French rms → Belgium Panel B. Chinese rms → Japan
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Figure 2. Welfare Gains, Sensitivity to M1 (entry rate)
Figure 3. Welfare Gains, Sensitivity to M3 (truncation)
MAY 2014316 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
Our ongoing work investigates the diver-
sity of those reactions to trade costs in a more 
 appropriate way, also departing from the mas-
sive simplification of the case of two symmetric 
countries.
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